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Paul John Eakin. Living Autobiographically: How We Create Identity in Nar-
rative. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2008. 184 pp. $17.95.
Ever since the publication of Fictions in Autobiography in 1985, Paul John 
Eakin has been a major presence in the ﬁ eld of autobiography studies. As with 
his other monographs, Eakin’s latest work, Living Autobiographically: How 
We Create Identity in Narrative, brings together elegance and range, as well 
as clarity and conceptual complexity. Like his other works, too, Living Auto-
biographically covers a wide range of theoretical and autobiographical texts. 
While not indifferent to literary theory per se, Eakin (as has been apparent for 
some time) is profoundly stimulated by theory that goes beyond not only the 
literary but also the humanities. Most notable in this monograph is Eakin’s 
use of recent research in neurobiology. With regard to his choice of autobio-
graphical texts for discussion, most are American, though Eakin does discuss 
the Australian writer David Malouf (a long-time favorite of Eakin’s), as well as 
the Norwegian autobiographical narratives analyzed in Marianne Gullestad’s 
Everyday Life Philosophers: Modernity, Morality, and Autobiography in Norway 
(1996). Eakin’s interest in Gullestad’s work, which is based on a project that 
elicited autobiographical narratives from “ordinary” individuals, shows that 
he is not solely concerned with so-called “literary” texts, something also seen 
in his discussion of the “Portraits of Grief” series that appeared in the New 
York Times in the wake of 9/11.
Bringing together such disparate texts, auto/biographical procedures, and 
theoretical concerns is an ambitious enterprise. Most ambitious of all is that 
Living Autobiographically brings “culturalist” and biological frameworks to-
gether as a way of answering the question “Why do people tell and sometimes 
write their life stories?” (151). Eakin begins his study into “how we create 
identity in narrative” by reiterating and developing some of the insights of his 
previous work, How Our Lives Become Stories: Making Selves (1999). Eakin 
argues that narrative and identity are essentially continuous, pointing to the 
role that narrative plays in identity formation in children, as well as to the ef-
fect that pathological inability to effectively self-narrate (caused by conditions 
such as Alzheimer’s disease) has on identity. It should be said that Eakin’s 
interest in the narrative basis of identity is neither novel nor especially origi-
nal. David Carr’s Time, Narrative, and History (1986), which uncovers “the 
narrative features of everyday experience” (16), has clear implications for any 
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study into the link between narrative and identity. Eakin’s use of the term 
“narrative identity” is strikingly similar to my use of the term “narrative self” 
in Artful Histories: Modern Australian Autobiography (1996), which similarly 
proposed that narrative was not merely a medium for the description of iden-
tity, but constitutive of identity itself. There are numerous other examples of 
scholars who have taken this line of thinking.
Where Living Autobiographically is strikingly original is in its attempt to 
trace not only the cultural determinants of narrative identity but also the bio-
logical ones. The book is made up of four parts. The ﬁ rst two are theoretical 
chapters. Chapter one deals with the cultural inﬂ uences on narrative models 
of identity (with particular emphasis on the ethical ramiﬁ cations of determin-
ing when a human subject does and does not have an “identity”), while chap-
ter two deals with the relationship between biology and selfhood. The third 
and fourth chapters offer practical discussions of these two areas of concern, 
focusing on a handful of texts to illustrate the theoretical positions outlined 
in the ﬁ rst two chapters. The ﬁ rst half of the book, then, “identiﬁ es the raw 
materials of the pervasive self-modeling that structures our living,” while the 
second half “shows this identity work in action” (xi).
While this split may be simple enough, it hides a major complication that 
Eakin does not sufﬁ ciently address. Eakin repeatedly speculates that autobi-
ography is not simply “something we read in a book,” but is also “a discourse 
of identity, delivered bit by bit, in the stories we tell ourselves day in and day 
out . . .” (4). As he puts it elsewhere, “I am approaching autobiography not 
only as a literary genre but also as an integral part of a lifelong process of iden-
tity formation” (34). Clearly there is a link between autobiography as a liter-
ary act and autobiographical thinking, but the two are not, I believe, wholly 
continuous. They have different occasions, forms, and modes of regulation. 
Simply put, social rules are not necessarily the same as literary ones. In addi-
tion, autobiographical self-narration is more continuous, dynamic, and open 
to revision than autobiography.
The ramiﬁ cations of eliding the distinction between autobiography and 
“the autobiographical” is seen clearly in the ﬁ rst chapter on the social and 
cultural “rules” that govern narrative self-modeling. Eakin notes that these 
rules often pertain to the subject’s ability to “structure a narratively coherent 
life story” (30). As Eakin points out, there are considerable legal, social, and 
medical ramiﬁ cations for those who will not or cannot construct a narrative 
that is considered sufﬁ ciently coherent. But while Eakin’s case is clear with re-
gard to social contexts, the link between social rule-breaking and literary rule-
breaking (whereby the literary is usually inherently concerned with breaking 
rules) is less clear. Eakin points to the ramiﬁ cations of “rule-breakers” such as 
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Rigoberta Menchú (whose ground-breaking testimonio, I, Rigoberta Menchú 
[1983], was accused by the anthropologist David Stoll of being inaccurate) 
and Kathryn Harrison (whose memoir of incest, The Kiss [1997], “triggered 
a ﬂ ood of condemnation” [32] in the US media, primarily for the supposed 
effect that her confessions would have on her children). Certainly we self-
narrate under “constraints,” as Eakin points out, but are examples such as 
Menchú’s and Harrison’s really paradigmatic of such constraints? If we claim 
to Social Security that we are someone we are not, the ramiﬁ cations will be 
different from claiming to be someone we are not in an autobiography. And 
as Eakin shows, the “inaccuracies” in a work such as Menchú’s (a work that 
led to her receiving the Nobel Prize) have received different critical and social 
responses from the imposture found in Binjamin Wilkomirski’s holocaust 
“memoir” Fragments (1995). 
The irony of Eakin’s approach to autobiography as “a lifelong process 
of identity formation” is that he fails to take fully into account the differ-
ent and complex “rules” that apply to the literary sphere. The clearest ex-
ample of this failure is in Eakin’s discussion of Harrison’s The Kiss, a work 
that violated no laws or social “rules” concerning truthfulness or coherence. 
Despite this, the local response to the publication of the work suggests that 
some unspoken “rule” had indeed been broken. Harrison (who was at col-
lege when the sexual liaison with her father began) was largely presented by 
the US media as not a victim of abuse, but a victimizer of her own young 
children for making her story public. How Harrison’s act precisely is abusive 
of her children is never made clear. Eakin’s claim that “Harrison has been 
judged more harshly for violating privacy—both others’ and her own—than 
for breaking the incest taboo” (42) illustrates the incoherence regarding Har-
rison’s putative “rule-breaking,” since it is not clear how one can “violate” 
one’s own privacy, nor is it clear that the response to Harrison’s “violation” 
of privacy is not, in fact, a covert judgment for her breaking of the incest ta-
boo. This latter point is implied by Eakin’s own reference to a “glossy full-
page photo” of Harrison in Vogue as “portraying the former incest victim as 
a disturbingly glamorous fashion plate” (42). Clearly Harrison has deployed 
profound anxieties about incest and female sexuality that cannot be openly 
engaged in the American context, but which have nevertheless been raised in 
this case of a woman speaking the unspeakable in ways that do not conform 
to the available “genres” of victimization that would have made Harrison’s 
self-narration publicly acceptable. That such a woman is also a mother makes 
her actions all the more volatile. Had the events of The Kiss been narrated as 
part of a “lifelong process of identity formation” in prescribed medical, legal, 
or educational contexts, Harrison would have been unlikely to have achieved 
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notoriety. Rather, it is the difference between autobiography (as literature) 
and ongoing identity formation (a difference that, as Eakin points out, can 
also be ﬁ nancial) that causes such social anxiety in this case.
If the gap between autobiography and autobiographical thinking is prob-
lematic in Eakin’s discussion of autobiography as a social act, then what of his 
project to ﬁ nd the “somatic sources” of autobiography (59)? How “biologi-
cal” is autobiography? The question is an exciting, if daunting, one. Relying 
largely on Antonio R. Damasio’s neurological research into consciousness, 
Eakin posits a link between the literary presentation of self and its “nonver-
bal, biological manifestations” (71). He does this by ﬁ nding links between 
Damasio’s “wordless narrative of core consciousness” and “the expression of 
self in autobiographical narrative” (75). These links are that both are “tem-
poral forms,” both “generate the illusion of a teller” (75), and both “serve a 
homeostatic goal” (76).
This last example strikes me as the most interesting and also the most prob-
lematic. Eakin argues that biological homeostasis (the maintenance of equilib-
rium or a stable bodily state) is equivalent to the homeostatic purpose of self 
narration which aims to create a sense of stable identity. This is an interesting 
and potentially productive metaphor. It is also one that hides behind it much 
argument about whether identity is indeed stable. Let’s say there is something 
homeostatic about identity. Does that necessarily mean that identity is part of 
homeostasis (that it is, in effect, “biological”)? If identity is indeed “part of” 
homeostasis, and therefore biological, then presumably it would make sense 
to consider those events and literary forms that mark and narrate a loss of sta-
bility. If identity is homeostatic, then bodily and psychological crises, conver-
sions, and traumas would be the main challenges that a homeostatic model of 
identity would face. Unfortunately, Eakin shows no sustained interest in the 
large literature (both “primary” and “secondary”) on crisis and conversion. It 
is perhaps telling that Eakin’s “practical” criticism on the biological sources of 
autobiography comprises the shortest chapter in Living Autobiographically.
Eakin, understandably perhaps, has most to say about the social and cultur-
al determinants of autobiography. His emphasis within this area is most often 
on class, and the highlight of the book is a self-reﬂ exive moment when Eakin 
reﬂ ects on (and includes) his own attempt to write autobiographically. This is 
literary criticism that is both emotionally charged and intellectually challeng-
ing. It shows how Eakin is often at his most insightful when talking about men 
and fathers (something also seen in his discussion of Jonathan Franzen’s “My 
Father’s Brain,” from How to Be Alone [2003]). As his discussion of André Aci-
man’s New Yorker essay “Arbitrage” (2003) also shows, however, Eakin is not 
always especially sensitive to the sexual politics of gender and its tropes.
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Living Autobiographically is a major work by a major critic in the ﬁ eld of 
autobiography studies. While it may raise as many questions as it answers, it 
represents an ambitious attempt to broaden an already broad ﬁ eld of study. Its 
attempt to integrate the literary and the non-literary, the humanities and the 
sciences, is a major project that will no doubt be furthered by future scholars.
David McCooey
David Parker. The Self in Moral Space: Life Narrative and the Good. Ithaca: 
Cornell UP, 2007. 208 pp. ISBN: 978-0-8014-4561-3, $35.00.
The Self in Moral Space is a response to recent work in the ethics of life writ-
ing. However,, it is not simply a contribution to this emergent ﬁ eld. Rather, it 
attempts a much more ambitious task: that of providing a theoretical justiﬁ -
cation and basis for studying life writing through the lens of the ethical. 
In pursuing this project, Parker draws heavily on the work of philoso-
pher Charles Taylor, who claims that a human life is not well understood 
if it is analyzed from a purely external perspective—in terms of sociological 
explanation, for instance. For Taylor, the ﬁ rst-person perspective, which re-
veals what is of moral or spiritual signiﬁ cance in shaping a life, is essential for 
understanding what it is to be a “self.” This implies that philosophers who 
wish to understand the self would do well to draw upon life writing and the 
wealth of detail it offers in providing concrete examples of how ethical values 
shape self-development and self-understanding. Conversely, it also s uggests 
that scholars of life writing have a vital role to play in contributing to the his-
torical, cultural, and philosophical understanding of the Western self. How-
ever, they will fulﬁ ll this role only if they read their textual sources with an 
eye for what Bernard Williams calls the “thick ethical concepts” that make 
up “languages of the good”: the languages by which individuals orient them-
selves in “moral space.”
The value Parker sees in this role for the life writing critic leads him into 
polemical combat with those who favor “thin” theoretical languages, which 
en courage the analysis of life writing in terms of discursive systems or power 
relations. Such readings are driven by what he dubs “post-Saussurian” or 
“neo-Nietzschean” theories in which the self is regarded as a ﬁ ction, or some-
thing to be overcome (19). Very few actual examples of such allegedly mis-
guided readings are given in Parker’s book, however. Rather than engaging 
in any sustained or substantial attack on his rhetorical opponent, he chooses 
instead to fortify his own position with a series of engaging examples of the 
mode of philosophical literary criticism he advocates, including a few pro-
vocative forays into what might be considered enemy territory.
